

They fired all the trans engineers to “stop DEI” and then were left with incompetent white cis men who can’t patch a router. You could argue the cause was not enough transgender folks.


They fired all the trans engineers to “stop DEI” and then were left with incompetent white cis men who can’t patch a router. You could argue the cause was not enough transgender folks.


never attribute to malice that which may be explained by incompetence.


Actually the companies his department regulates donated the money for his road trip vblog, but that in no way is a bribe…


Yeah exactly. Although you could probably argue that the phone number itself would be the second form of identification. I guess though that the DOB is on all the charts, not the phone number?


This might just be a holdover for how they deal with patients in a hospital. When nurses and doctors are running between patients, they need to make sure they’re not looking at the wrong chart for someone with a similar name as yours, and then administer the wrong care. Not sure what the medical-related calls you’re receiving are, but considering they’re health related, it seems like it’s similar.
If you’re concerned that the calls could be spoofed, I’d suggest to always let the call go to voicemail and then call them back at the phone number you have for them (not the one that showed up on caller id). This might be more annoying to deal with a phone tree and hold times, but it’s the price to pay.


The description seems cut off for me, here’s the full text from the tweet:
More details on the root cause can be found in the Microsoft 365 Admin center, and an abridged version can be found below.
We are deeply sorry for the impact to all our customers and recognize the impact that this has on their normal business & operations.
The incident on Thursday, November 12th, 2026, was caused by three main factors that together caused a global outage for the networking gateway that fronts many Microsoft 365 services.
First, a latent defect caused servers to become overwhelmed and unresponsive under certain load conditions. This was due to lock contention inside an internal process which caused the machine to become unavailable. This defect was the result of a fix that was prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the underlying defect nor the fix applies to broader Windows deployments.
The initial change in behavior first started deployment in July of this year. The update went through safe deployment and saturated globally over several weeks, during which time no issues were observed. For more than three months, the change was deployed worldwide without impact.
Our normal load testing did not detect the latent issue because the different traffic and SKU mix used in our test labs. The contention issue is worsened on machines with more cores and newer hardware; whereas our load testing tended to focus on our weaker hardware SKUs with fewer cores.
Second, a surge in load increased the likelihood for the networking gateways to encounter the contention. Within Microsoft 365, we maintain two independent and heterogenous network gateway systems designed for isolation and high availability. This allows many Microsoft 365 services to fail to/from them during outages or disruptions. Approximately fifteen hours before the outage, Teams failed over from the alternative networking gateway to the ‘primary’ gateway that also supports Exchange Online. This increased the load on the networking gateway and changed its traffic patterns. This type of failover is part of normal operations and is integral to standard Microsoft resiliency efforts.
Third, at the same time, nearly 14% of server capacity for the networking gateway was out of service due to an unrelated issue from the previous day. This server capacity was on track to be returned to active service through routine maintenance and health processes. The service had sufficient capacity headroom, so the reduction in server capacity had no impact on its own.
Taken together, the increased load and the reduced server capacity, caused the network gateway to encounter the latent bug from July. This caused requests to build up until servers ultimately stopped responding. This occurred during the peak window of traffic in the United States.
When servers lose connectivity, our traffic management systems automatically route users to other healthy endpoints. This happens often and is critical to avoiding any interruption due to hardware, software, or network defects and is normally what makes the service resilient. However, the redirected traffic increased the likelihood for the same problem to occur on the remaining endpoints. This caused a cascading failure from server to server as the same amount of load was spread across fewer servers. In less than two hours, the previously unknown defect was encountered across our fleet and rendered them unresponsive. At its lowest, more than 80% of servers were unresponsive.
Normally, the network gateway is composed of thousands of ‘capacity units’ which represent shards of capacity, hardware, and networking infrastructure. These ‘capacity units’ are then organized into regions. In this case, due to a separate issue, the normal bulkheads between these different partitions did not stop the cascading failure. This is what allowed the impact to spread across our network gateway infrastructure globally.
Several services like Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Office apps failed out of the faulty network gateway infrastructure. That is why those services were restored earlier, with Teams chats and meetings functioning without issue for most of the outage. But not all services, like Exchange Online, can fail out of this network gateway.
Recovery took longer than usual because as servers returned to service, they were immediately overwhelmed by waiting traffic and became unresponsive again. Our normally automated recovery processes were not designed to restore service from this broad unresponsive state. Additionally, since the main code defect was a latent bug from several months previous, our normal rollback, flighting, and feature flags were unable to quickly revert the change.
After engineers confirmed the defect as the cause, we developed an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state. To effectively apply this fix, and to slowly bring the service online again, we took groups of servers out of service, applied the change, and restarted them before returning them to service. This process was carefully applied to large quantities of infrastructure at a time (e.g. 50%+ of a region).
The final Post-Incident Review (PIR) will provide more details later this week.


It is implemented and enforced for old.reddit.com. It’s unclear if that’s in preparation for discontinuing the old interface or to enforce for the main website.


Not sure where the misinterpretation is, but I am assuming they have a license to operate in these US cities because they’re currently operating in these US cities.


There’s a pretty good book from like 15 years ago called Trust Me, I’m Lying: Confessions of a Media Manipulator written by the former Director of Marketing for American Apparel, Ryan Holiday that basically outlines how fragile and easy it is to manipulate this system. A lot of the anecdotes in the book are similar to this, fake something and create some online buzz, and then get a small publication with no fact checking to write an article about it, and use that to then get larger publications to publish false information. Eventually it becomes a circular web of articles all quoting the false claim from eachother, and enough of a paper trail to even get Wikipedia updated with false information with a lot of citations


That’s amazing, but from the YT description of that vid:
Not that i could prove any of this but oh well: Me and the drummer talked to the owners right before they were closing this location and they were gonna have the lease through the end of the month. They said they were shutting down for business the next day and we asked if we could have a small show there.


Holy shit that’s terrifying.


Yes in many cities: https://support.google.com/waymo/answer/9059119
The shrill laughing in front of the tomb seemed to be the final straw for the guard, and that was after posing for photos and talking.
The tomb has been guarded continuously since 1948, even during rain and snow. I know it’s an honor to guard it, but to me that seems like punishment.


There was reporting that Meta (IIRC) was testing a bot that could cancel subscriptions and wait on hold for you, turned out they were using call-center employees to pick up what the bots couldn’t handle.
I think most of the AI companies have a “pay no attention to that man behind the curtain” secret. Even Waymo has human operators in the philippines to jump in and take over from the “full self driving taxis”.


The post link is just an image of a blond girl and a thumbnail. The real link is in the description, but then that’s an article about a youtube video. Just link to the YouTube video directly, so that people can down vote based on the content and not the presentation.


Perfect timed with the RAM apocalypse if it can make things more efficient for non generalized devices. This is a good Veritasium video about analog computing which helps explain some of the benefits like this paper describes.
I don’t know much about history, but police being German in hell sounds like this was from WW2.
Plus the election is ranked choice, if you were confused, you could have selected all the Dans and been fine. The whole plan was so dumb, why go through the effort to get a spoiler canadiate in an election that can’t be spoiled.